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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
This study uses Irish data from the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) to 
examine the factors underlying differences in the relative risk of being in receipt of 
the National Minimum Wage (NMW) among groups with relatively high rates of 
exposure to NMW employment, such as females, young people and non-Irish 
nationals. The results for Ireland are then compared with the UK. The study 
attempts to identify the factors driving a higher propensity of minimum wage 
employment among specific risk groups. The research is interested in 
understanding the degree to which the likelihood of minimum wage employment 
is driven by factors such as personal characteristics (like education and 
experience), job conditions within particular occupations or factors related to 
household composition and caring responsibilities.  
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: INCIDENCE AND INDIVIDUAL / HOUSEHOLD 
CHARACTERISTICS  
• The incidence of adult minimum wage employment in 2014 was 4.9 per cent, 
which represents a slight decline from the rate of 5.6 per cent recorded in 
2013. The comparable incidence of minimum wage employment in the UK in 
2014 was higher, at 7.7 per cent. 
• In 2014, females were over twice as likely to be earning the minimum wage 
relative to males. Specifically, 6.9 per cent of female employees were in 
receipt of the NMW, compared to 2.7 per cent of male employees. This 
compares to female and male rates of 6.7 per cent and 4.3 per cent in 2013, 
respectively. Given that the sample of NMW workers in the SILC data is 
relatively small, we cannot rule out the possibility that the increased gender 
disparity observed in the 2014 data reflects temporary sampling disparities, 
as opposed to a permanent shift in the composition of NMW employees. 
Consequently, we would stress that the recent observed increase in the 
female NMW share should be treated with some caution. Nevertheless, the 
finding that females are much more likely to be in receipt of the NMW seems 
consistent with international trends; it is therefore unlikely that this finding is 
due to sampling error. 
• At 9 per cent, the incidence of minimum wage pay among non-Irish nationals 
was over twice that of Irish employees.  
• With regard to age, young persons in the 18–29 age category had the highest 
exposure to NMW employment, at 13.9 per cent.  
• Workers with lower levels of schooling were more likely to fall into the 
minimum wage category relative to graduates.  
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• The NMW incidence was almost three times higher among part-time workers 
compared to their full-time equivalents. The incidence of NMW employment 
was also particularly high among: individuals employed on temporary 
contracts (7 per cent); those working between 1 and 19 hours weekly (11.7 
per cent); those employed in the accommodation and food sector (15.3 per 
cent); and those in sales (14.4 per cent) and elementary (13.4 per cent) 
occupations. 
• In terms of composition, females accounted for almost three-quarters of 
NMW workers in the period, while young people (18–29 years) and migrants 
made up 53.3 and 25.5 per cent of NMW employees, respectively. A 
comparison of these figures to average employment shares of females (51.9 
per cent), young people (18.5 per cent) and migrants (13.5 per cent) 
demonstrates that these groups are disproportionately represented among 
NMW employees relative to what would be expected given their overall 
presence in the labour market. 
• Relative to the UK, we see that the incidence of minimum wage employment 
is broadly similar across the two countries in respect of gender, age, education 
and job-related characteristics. However, the percentage of NMW workers 
who are foreign citizens is higher in Ireland compared to the UK (25.5 per cent 
versus 13.6 per cent), which cannot solely be explained by the fact that foreign 
citizens in Ireland also make up a larger proportion of the entire workforce 
compared to the UK (13.5 per cent versus 9.7 per cent). 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: POVERTY RISK 
• Employees in receipt of the NMW are more at risk of poverty than non-NMW 
workers. Specifically, 17 per cent of NMW workers belong to households 
whose income is less than 60 per cent of the median equivalised household 
income, compared to a rate of 3.3 per cent of non-NMW workers. 
• In terms of deprivation rates (defined as being unable to afford at least 2 out 
of 11 basic items, including food, clothing, heating, furniture and some social 
participation activities), 28 per cent of NMW workers are defined as being 
deprived, relative to 19.5 per cent of non-NMW workers. 
• With regard to the incidence of consistent poverty (defined as being both at 
risk of poverty and deprived), 5.7 per cent of NMW workers fall into this 
category, compared to 1.6 per cent of non-NMW workers. 
• The poverty and deprivation patterns with respect to gender are somewhat 
mixed. Female NMW workers are much more likely to belong to households 
at risk of poverty (20.2 per cent compared to 7.8 per cent for male NMW 
workers); however, the deprivation rate for NMW workers of both genders is 
28 per cent. With respect to consistent poverty, male NMW workers have a 
household incidence of 7.6 per cent, compared to 5.0 per cent for female 
NMW employees. 
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DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: GENDER, HOUSEHOLD EARNING STATUS AND 
PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT 
• Within the labour market, 75 per cent of male employees and 60 per cent of 
female employees describe themselves as primary earners. By contrast, just 
under 50 per cent of both male and female NMW workers describe 
themselves as such. 
• When we focus the analysis on households with more than 1 employee 
earner, the data show that NMW employees are much more likely than 
average to be secondary earners and this is particularly true for females. Just 
13 per cent of NMW-earning females in multiple-earner households are 
primary earners, compared to 19.5 per cent of males. 
• Part-time workers account for over 50 per cent of all NMW employees and 56 
per cent of all female NMW workers, indicating that uncovering the motives 
for doing low-paid part-time work among females is important for 
understanding the factors underlying the gender imbalance in NMW 
employment. Females may face constraints that impact their ability to 
transition from part-time to full-time employment. This could be due to the 
gendered division of work in the home, if there is an expectation that women’s 
paid work should fit their family life. Welfare policies may also create 
disincentives for women with children to return to full-time work. In Ireland, 
the high cost of childcare is a particularly important factor influencing 
women’s employment decisions. 
• Part-time employees in the SILC data were asked a series of questions 
regarding their motives for accepting their current jobs, which provides us 
with some insights into the motives for NMW employment, albeit one that is 
restricted to the part-time component of the labour market. Just under three-
quarters of male part-time NMW workers describe themselves as under-
employed (they would prefer to work more hours or in a full-time job), 
compared to just under one-third of female part-time workers. Just under 
one-quarter of female part-time workers accepted their part-time NMW job 
because it enabled them to look after children or other people, a factor that 
did not influence part-time NMW male employees. Just over 20 per cent of 
male and female part-time NMW workers accepted their current job because 
it enabled them to combine work with education and training.  
• While minimum wage workers have an above-average tendency to belong to 
economically disadvantaged households, these types of individuals make up 
only a small proportion of the total population of minimum wage employees. 
For example, 28 per cent of employees on the minimum wage in 2014 were 
from deprived households, compared to 19.5 per cent of workers earning 
above the minimum wage. Therefore, minimum wage increases will also 
benefit a large number of individuals who are not from economically 
disadvantaged or deprived households. The estimates confirm previous 
analysis by both the Irish Low Pay Commission and Logue and Callan (2016), 
which concluded that, as a policy tool, the NMW will have only a limited effect 
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on widespread poverty reduction. Similar to the UK, household poverty risk in 
Ireland may be more a problem of joblessness than of low pay (Nickel, 2004; 
Watson et al., 2012). 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
• Multivariate analysis indicates that being female raises the probability that an 
individual is in receipt of the NMW by 3 percentage points. After controlling 
for a range of other factors that potentially explain the incidence of NMW 
employment, the additional risk associated with gender falls to 1 percentage 
point. The results from the models suggest that two-thirds of the initial 3 
percentage point differential can be explained by a combination of the types 
of jobs undertaken by females and the occupations or sectors within which 
they are located. Females in receipt of the NMW had a greater tendency to 
work in the private sector, on a part-time basis, or in firms either located in 
certain sectors, such as accommodation and food, or that had fewer 
employees.  
• We also show that young people aged 18–29 years were 9 percentage points 
more likely to be in receipt of the NMW, relative to those aged 50–59 years. 
This youth penalty disappeared when we controlled for tenure, job type, 
occupation and sector. The results suggest that the higher NMW risk faced by 
young people is explained entirely by factors such as lower levels of 
experience and the type of employment undertaken, or sector involved.  
• Much of the initial higher relative risk faced by migrants (5 percentage points) 
and individuals with low levels of schooling (7 percentage points) is accounted 
for when we control for both job type and sector. However, a significant risk 
of up to 3 percentage points for both groups cannot be explained by the data 
in our models. 
• For the UK, the results show a similar pattern to Ireland. The effects of gender, 
nationality, education, single-parent household status and firm size on the 
likelihood of minimum wage employment in the UK strongly resemble the 
Irish results. A number of differences do exist, however. Specifically, working 
1 to 19 hours per week in the UK has a stronger effect on the probability of 
being a minimum wage worker compared to the Irish data. There are also 
differences relating to occupation, with craft and protective services 
occupations having a greater effect on the likelihood of minimum wage 
employment and sales having a smaller effect compared to Ireland. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From a policy perspective, the research raises a number of important questions. 
While the higher relative risk faced by females is low, it is also the case that females 
face higher relative disadvantage. This is largely related to an increased likelihood 
of working part-time and a higher concentration of females in sectors such as 
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‘wholesale and retail’, ‘accommodation and food’ and ‘other’. Further research is 
required to understand the extent to which females choosing to work part-time or 
to balance work and family life with a full-time job can do so within their chosen 
occupations or are forced to switch to lower-paying sectors or occupations. Given 
that sectoral effects also appear to play a role in explaining the higher relative risk 
experienced by non-Irish nationals, young people and workers with low levels of 
schooling, the reasons underlying low pay in sectors where NMW employees are 
heavily concentrated require further investigation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Minimum wages have become an increasingly common feature of modern labour 
markets. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 26 of its 34 members currently implement statutory 
minimum wages (OECD, 2015). It appears that the adoption of minimum wage 
legislation has gathered pace over recent decades, with 9 of the 26 countries 
having adopted the minimum wage since 1990. Consistent with this trend, the 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) in Ireland was implemented in 2000. 
The policy motives for adopting minimum wages are wide ranging and vary from 
country to country. However, the policy is primarily implemented in order to 
ensure a minimum earnings level for low-paid workers who are generally accepted 
to have low levels of bargaining power. Additional policy objectives relate to the 
reduction of wage inequality and in-work poverty. With respect to Ireland, a Low 
Pay Commission was established in 2015 with the remit of making 
recommendations to government on the most appropriate level of the NMW. In 
its role, the Low  Pay Commission is tasked with recommending a rate that assists 
as many low-paid workers as possible, to set a rate that is both fair and sustainable, 
taking into account the likely impacts on factors such as general earnings growth, 
inequality, employment, unemployment and competitiveness.1 Thus, the primary 
objective of the legislation in Ireland is consistent with those of other countries 
with a focus on ensuring fair pay for workers with low bargaining power. Given the 
underlying policy context, this report identifies the characteristics of individuals 
most likely to be impacted by minimum wage decisions in the context of both 
individual and household traits. By taking this approach, we are attempting to 
understand the factors driving the higher propensity of minimum wage 
employment among specific groups such as females, young people and migrants. 
We are interested in understanding the degree to which the likelihood of minimum 
wage employment is driven by factors such as personal characteristics (like 
education and experience), job conditions within particular occupations, or factors 
related to household composition and caring responsibilities.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview 
of the relevant research literature. Chapter 3 presents a discussion of descriptive 
statistics relating to the incidence of minimum wage employment in Ireland among 
various subgroups of the population, as well as statistics on poverty and 
                                                          
1 Specified under the National Minimum Wage (Low Pay Commission Act) 2015. 
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deprivation. It also provides comparative statistics for the UK. Chapter 4 outlines 
the methodology used, while Chapter 5 presents the results. Chapter 6 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Background and literature review 
From 2007 to 2016, the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in Ireland was €8.65 per 
hour for an adult worker.2 However, following the establishment of a Low Pay 
Commission in 2015 and their subsequent recommendations, recent amendments 
have been made to the NMW. In January 2016, the rate for an adult worker 
increased from €8.65 to €9.15 per hour and in Budget 2017 the Irish government 
announced that the NMW would further increase to €9.25 from January 2017.3  
When designing and implementing minimum wage policies, it is important to know 
which segments of the population are most affected by these changes. However, 
as noted by Belman et al. (2015), studies on the minimum wage typically focus on 
what the minimum wage affects, namely focusing on employment outcomes, 
rather than who it affects.4 From a theoretical perspective, the employment effects 
of minimum wages differ depending on the model used to describe the labour 
market. There are two main textbook models of the labour market, both of which 
predict different outcomes. The model of a perfectly competitive labour market 
predicts that a binding minimum wage (a minimum wage that is greater than the 
market clearing wage) will result in a decrease in employment due to demand for 
labour falling short of supply of labour as a result of the higher wage. However, in 
the monopsony model, there is one employer (buyer of labour) who has a degree 
of market power, which enables them to keep wages below the perfectly 
competitive wage rate. If a minimum wage is set that is higher than the monopsony 
wage, but lower than (or equal to) the perfectly competitive wage, then the 
monopsony model predicts an increase in employment.  
While not focusing specifically on minimum wage workers, a related strand of the 
literature considers the characteristics of low-wage workers. Eurostat (2016) looks 
at low-wage employment in the European Union and finds that, on average,  
females, young people and those with low levels of education are more likely to be 
low-wage workers.5 Specifically, it found that 21.1 per cent of female employees, 
30.1 per cent of employees under 30 years of age and 28.2 per cent of employees 
                                                          
2 In February 2011, the rate was reduced from €8.65 to €7.65 per hour for an adult worker; however, this 
decision was reversed in July 2011 and the minimum wage of €8.65 was restored.  
3 There are also sub-minimum rates for workers aged under 18 (€6.48 per hour) and those aged over 18 and in 
their first year of employment (€7.40 per hour) or their second year of employment (€8.33 per hour). In addition, 
employees aged over 18 who are in structured training during working hours may receive between 75 per cent 
and 90 per cent of the NMW. 
4 For example, a large body of literature investigates the employment effects of minimum wage changes, with 
the evidence pointing to small or zero effects. For recent studies see, for example, Baek and Park (2016), Liu et 
al. (2016), Dolton et al. (2015) and Hirsch et al. (2015). 
5 Low-wage earners are defined as individuals that earned two-thirds or less of their national median gross 
hourly earnings.  
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with low levels of education are low-wage earners, compared to 13.5 per cent of 
male employees, 13.5 per cent of employees aged 30–59 years and just 7 per cent 
of employees with a high education level. Lucifora et al. (2005) review the evidence 
on low-wage employment in Europe and find that the low-paying industries tend 
to be the same across countries; they include retail, hotels and catering, agriculture 
and personal services. 
The empirical literature has identified heterogeneous impacts of minimum wage 
changes across various subgroups of the population. Dickens et al. (2015) find 
negative employment effects for females working part-time in the UK, with no 
effect for full-time workers. Autor et al. (2016) show that in the US, females are 
the main beneficiaries of minimum wage related reductions in earnings inequality. 
In related work, Schafer and Gottschall (2015) find evidence that countries with a 
higher minimum wage relative to median earnings have lower gender pay gaps. 
However, Blau and Kahn (2003) find no significant effect of minimum wages on the 
gender pay gap when collective bargaining coverage is controlled for. Belman et al. 
(2015) find little to no employment effect for teens, young adults and women as a 
result of minimum wage changes; however, there is evidence to suggest that single 
mothers with low education are negatively affected. The employment effect for 
men, where it exists, tends to be driven by an adjustment in hours worked. Liu et 
al. (2016) find that minimum wage increases lead to negative employment effects 
for 14–18 year olds in the US, with no effect for those aged 19–24 years. Our study, 
while related to this strand of literature, differs in that we examine the risk factors 
in both the UK and Ireland that determine whether or not an individual is likely to 
be a minimum wage worker, such as age, education, gender, family status and 
occupation, as opposed to different outcomes of minimum wage changes among 
subgroups of the population.6 This approach, which focuses on why certain groups 
are more likely to be in receipt of the minimum wage (as opposed to whether the 
impact of the minimum wage has differential impacts across groups) is somewhat 
rare. For Australia, McGuinness and Freebairn (2007) find that a variety of factors 
related to both personal characteristics and job characteristics are important 
determinants of being in low pay. Specifically, McGuinness and Freebairn (2007) 
found that risk of low pay was higher for workers with low levels of educational 
attainment, aged 21–30 or above 60 years, employed in casual jobs or non-
unionised firms or employed part-time.  
With respect to the role of individual characteristics, a common theme across 
countries is that females and part-time workers account for a disproportionate 
share of minimum wage workers. In the Irish data, we see that females account for 
                                                          
6 Eurostat figures show that the minimum wage, expressed as a percentage of the median gross monthly 
earnings, was 47 per cent in the UK and 44 per cent in Ireland. (See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics.) 
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almost three-quarters of minimum wage employees in 2014 and part-time workers 
account for over 50 per cent of minimum wage employees, despite making up only 
30 per cent of all employees. There is also evidence to suggest that females are 
particularly penalised as a consequence of being more likely to take time out of the 
labour market for the purposes of childrearing and other caring responsibilities. 
Joshi et al. (1999) show that women who interrupted their employment at 
childbirth incurred a subsequent pay penalty, while McGuinness et al. (2011) 
identify taking time out of the labour market for family reasons as a key factor in 
explaining the gender pay gap in Ireland. The same paper provides some insights 
into the extent to which the disproportionate presence of females among 
minimum wage workers is related to family-related decisions by examining 
responses to a battery of questions on job motives among part-time workers in the 
SILC data.  
Minimum wage employment within developed economies tends to be 
concentrated within particular sectors and occupations, suggesting that 
occupational segregation may be responsible for the disproportionate presence of 
particular groups among minimum wage employees. It should be noted that the 
debate around occupational segregation is also linked with the issue of family 
responsibilities on the grounds that females may select into certain occupations 
that facilitate greater flexibility to combine work and caring roles; nevertheless, 
there is evidence to suggest that the necessity to make such trade-offs tends to 
force many females into low-paid occupations. Manning and Petrongola (2008) 
argue that, in the UK, females working part-time earn less than their full-time 
counterparts as they are more likely to be employed in jobs that tend to not be 
available on a full-time basis, suggesting that it is not always possible for a woman 
with family responsibilities to remain in their chosen occupation. Thus, the higher 
incidence of low pay among females may be due to the necessity of being forced 
to switch to lower-paid employment, in order to balance work and caring 
commitments (Gregory and Connolly, 2008). For the US, England et al. (1999) 
found little evidence to support the view that occupations with disproportionately 
high shares of female workers had lower pay penalties for intermittent 
employment, which is consistent with a constrained choice argument. McGinnity 
and McManus (2007), in a comparative study of Britain, the US and Germany, 
conclude that a range of factors related to social welfare entitlements, labour 
market structures and family policies jointly determine cross-country differences 
in the extent to which females working part-time can achieve a work–family 
balance, as well as the level of financial penalty associated with this mode of 
employment.  
Finally, considering factors such as household composition as a determining factor 
for minimum wage employment, our analysis also contributes to the debate in the 
literature as to whether an NMW is an effective tool for combating poverty. It is 
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not always clear whether the minimum wage targets the most disadvantaged 
groups in society. MaCurdy (2015) and Logue and Callan (2016) analyse the 
distributional impacts of minimum wage increases in the US and Ireland 
respectively and find that increases in the minimum wage are inefficient for 
boosting the incomes of poor families, as a substantial portion of the earnings 
increase goes to families at the higher end of the income distribution. The Irish Low 
Pay Commission (2016) has also stated that a minimum wage by itself appears to 
be a blunt instrument for tackling poverty. Likewise, Sabia and Nielsen (2015) find 
no evidence that the minimum wage reduces poverty in the US due to poor target 
efficiency. However, Holton and O’Neill (2017) find that the Irish minimum wage is 
an effective tool in protecting the income of low-skilled workers, particularly 
during recessions, while Autor et al. (2016) find that minimum wages reduce 
earnings inequality in the lower end of the earnings distribution in the US. Garnero 
et al. (2015) present similar results in a study of 18 European countries. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Data and descriptive statistics  
The data used in our analysis come from the Survey of Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) microdata, which is provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) 
in Ireland. SILC collects information on income and living conditions by means of 
household interviews, which take place on a continuous weekly basis throughout 
the year. The income reference period is the 12 months prior to the date of the 
interview. As such, the income reference period for 2014 spans from January 2013 
to December 2014. Participation in the survey is voluntary for the selected survey 
respondents. The overall response rate in 2014 was 54 per cent and the sample 
size was 5,486 households and 14,078 individuals. We focus our analysis on 
employees aged over 18 years of age. This does not include individuals working on 
community employment schemes, assisting relatives with unpaid work, 
undertaking apprenticeships or the self-employed.7 
The SILC data provide information on gross monthly earnings of employees in their 
main job and the number of hours usually worked. We use this information to 
calculate average hourly wage rates for employees. Collins (2015) suggests that 
given the calculations involved in estimating hourly earnings, it is likely that 
individuals whose estimated earnings are near the minimum wage are in fact on 
the minimum wage. Therefore, Collins (2015) identifies minimum wage earners as 
individuals whose hourly earnings are +/- 5 per cent from the €8.65 threshold. We 
use the same +/- 5 per cent cut-off, thereby categorising all employees earning 
between €8.22 and €9.08 per hour as being on the minimum wage. We find that 
4.9 per cent of employees are on the minimum wage in SILC 2014.8 There are few 
comprehensive sources of data in Ireland to compare estimates on the minimum 
wage; this paper draws on the results from the analysis of SILC 2014. Recently, in 
quarters 2–4 of the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) 2016, the CSO 
has included new questions about receipt of the National Minimum Wage (NMW). 
The CSO warns that the QNHS is not designed to be an earnings survey and that 
one ought to be cautious in interpreting these results. They found that, in that 
period, between 9 and 11 per cent of employees earned the minimum wage or less 
(CSO, 2017).9 Eurostat published figures that are more comparable with our own 
results. They show that in 2014, between 4 and 5 per cent of employees aged 21 
                                                          
7 The Community Employment (CE) scheme aims to support long-term unemployed people to get back to work 
with part-time and temporary jobs within local communities. 
8 Using the Irish SILC 2014, and taking account of the sub-minima rates distinguishing the tenure history for 
employees aged 18 and over, will increase the percentage of employees on the minimum wage by 0.2 
percentage points only. Only 4 per cent of employees on the minimum wage have a second job. 
9 The QNHS results differ from the SILC analysis done in this paper as the QNHS surveyed people aged 15 years 
and over while in SILC we restricted the analysis to those aged 18 years and over. Also, at the time of the QNHS 
survey in 2016, the reference to the minimum wage was €9.15 per hour while it was €8.65 in 2014. 
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years and over were earning less than 105 per cent of the monthly minimum wage, 
a result similar to that based on the analysis of SILC 2014 presented in this paper.10  
We generate descriptive statistics to show the risk of being on the minimum wage 
by various employee characteristics, comparing Ireland to the UK. In order to 
generate the comparative statistics for both countries, shown in Tables 1A and 1B, 
we use the 2014 EU-SILC data provided by Eurostat.11 The EU-SILC data and the 
SILC data provided by the CSO should produce the same results, which we verify 
by calculating the same statistics using both sets of data. The results are broadly 
the same, apart from small differences, typically in the order of 0.1 to 0.2 
percentage points, which may be due to Eurostat and the CSO using different 
weights. Some differences also exist for some of the socio-demographic variables 
due to harmonisation processes for the purpose of European comparison. 
However, this has no impact on the conclusions of the study. Descriptive statistics 
relating to gender, age, nationality, education, sector of work and job 
characteristics (hours and contract type) are shown in Table 1A. There are slight 
differences in the occupational categories for Ireland (SOC, 2010) and the UK (ISCO-
08) and as such, we present these statistics separately in Table 1B so that the 
differences in occupational categories are clear. 
We consider both the incidence of NMW employment and its composition by key 
characteristics. For example, the incidence measures the proportion of females 
and migrants who are in receipt of the NMW, while the compositional analysis 
assesses the proportion of NMW employees who are female or who are migrants. 
For each characteristic, we also show the ratio of the percentage of employees on 
the NMW to the percentage of all employees, thereby allowing us to clearly see 
whether certain characteristics are over- or under-represented among NMW 
employees. A figure greater than 1 indicates that a given characteristic is over-
represented among NMW workers relative to all workers. This approach is useful 
for illustrating that while certain groups may be disproportionally represented 
among NMW workers, the overwhelming majority of employees (95 per cent) earn 
above the NMW and, therefore, have a low NMW risk. In terms of incidence, Table 
1A shows that 4.9 per cent of adult employees were on the minimum wage in 
Ireland. Females were over twice as likely to be earning the minimum wage relative 
to males; specifically, 6.9 per cent of female employees were in receipt of the NMW 
compared to 2.7 per cent of male employees. This compares to male and female 
rates of 4.3 per cent and 6.7 per cent in 2013, respectively. Given that the sample 
of NMW workers in the SILC data is relatively small, we cannot rule out the 
                                                          
10 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics. 
11 The EU-SILC data are used for Tables 1A and 1B. The CSO SILC data are used throughout the remainder of 
the paper for the analysis relating to Ireland only. Due to sample size constraints, our descriptive analysis of 
occupations focuses only on sales and elementary occupations, which contain the highest percentage of MW 
employment out of all occupations. 
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possibility that the increased gender difference observed in the 2014 data reflects 
temporary sampling disparities, as opposed to a permanent shift in the 
composition of the NMW. Consequently, we would stress that the recent observed 
increase in the female NMW risk should be treated with some caution. 
Nevertheless, the finding that females are much more likely to be in receipt of the 
NMW seems consistent with international trends and therefore it is unlikely that 
this finding is due to sampling error. 
TABLE 1A  INCIDENCE AND COMPOSITION OF MINIMUM WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN IRELAND 
AND THE UK BASED ON GENDER, NATIONALITY, AGE, EDUCATION, SECTOR OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND JOB CHARACTERISTICS (%), EU-SILC 2014 
  
  
Composition 
% employees on 
NMW / % all 
employees 
  
Minimum wage 
incidence (%) 
% employees on 
the NMW 
% all employees   
  Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland UK 
Gender                 
Male 2.7 5.7 26.3 37.6 48.1 50.5 0.55 0.74 
Female 6.9 9.7 73.7 62.4 51.9 49.5 1.42 1.26 
Total 4.9 7.7 100 100 100 100 1.00 1.00 
                  
Nationality                 
National 4.2 7.4 74.5 86.4 86.5 90.3 0.86 0.96 
Foreign citizen 9 10.8 25.5 13.6 13.5 9.7 1.89 1.40 
                  
Age group                 
18–29 13.9 11.9 53.3 37 18.5 24 2.88 1.54 
30–39 3.6 6 22.9 17.8 31 23.1 0.74 0.77 
40–49 2.3 6.9 12.1 22.7 25.5 25.4 0.47 0.89 
50–59 2.2 6.1 8.4 15.7 18.9 19.8 0.44 0.79 
60+ 2.9 6.8 3.3 6.8 6 7.7 0.55 0.88 
                  
Education                 
Primary 5.2 11.9 4.9 2.8 4.8 1.8 1.02 1.56 
Secondary 7.2 10.6 46.6 74.4 31.9 53.9 1.46 1.38 
Post-secondary and 
tertiary 
4.5 3.9 48.4 22.8 63.3 44.3 0.76 0.51 
                  
NACE sector                 
Agriculture & industry [3.5] 6.6 [10.7] 11.5 15.4 13.4 0.69 0.86 
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TABLE 1A  (CONTD.) 
 
 
 
Composition 
% employees on 
NMW / % all 
employees 
  
Minimum wage 
incidence (%) 
% employees on 
the NMW 
% all employees   
  Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland UK Ireland UK 
Wholesale and retail 9 14.4 25.1 26.7 13.4 14.3 1.87 1.87 
Accommodation and 
food 
15.3 20.2 22.8 14.3 7.2 5.5 3.17 2.60 
Health and social work [3.5] 7.4 [10.3] 14.4 14.3 15.2 0.72 0.95 
Public admin and 
defence 
* 4.1 * 9 17.8 17.2 * 0.52 
Other 4.3 5.4 28.1 24.1 31.8 34.4 0.88 0.70 
                  
Hours worked per 
week 
                
1–19hrs 11.7 19.3 30.8 23.5 12.9 9.4 2.39 2.50 
20–34.9 hrs 6.4 11.7 29.7 28.7 22.6 19 1.31 1.51 
35hrs+ 3 5.2 39.5 47.7 64.5 71.6 0.61 0.67 
                  
Work status                 
Full-time 3.3 6 48.8 59.6 71.8 77.2 0.68 0.77 
Part-time 9.2 13.6 51.2 40.4 28.2 22.8 1.82 1.77 
                  
Contract type                 
Permanent job/ 
contract of unlimited 
duration 
4.4 7.5 84.6 94.9 89.6 96 0.94 0.99 
Temporary job/ work 
contact of limited 
duration 
7 9.7 15.4 5.1 10.4 4 1.48 1.28 
Total number of cases 3,981 8,420             
 
Note:  The asterix (*) indicates not enough observations to be reported. Parentheses [ ] indicate where there are 20–50 
observations in a cell. Such estimates are considered to have a wider margin of error and should be treated with 
caution.  
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TABLE 1B  INCIDENCE AND COMPOSITION OF MINIMUM WAGE EMPLOYMENT BY 
OCCUPATION IN IRELAND AND THE UK (%) EU-SILC 2014 
Occupation  
Minimum 
wage 
incidence (%) 
% employees 
on the NMW 
% all 
employees 
% employees 
on NMW / % 
all 
employees 
Occupation, Ireland (SOC2010)     
Sales and customer service occupations  14.4 26.7 9.3 2.87 
Elementary occupations 13.4 36.8 13.8 2.67 
     
Occupation, UK (ISCO-08)     
Services and sales workers 14.5 36.5 19.4 1.88 
Elementary occupations 18.7 22.8 9.4 2.43 
Note:  Due to some temporary issue of comparability in the EU-SILC data, the occupational results for Ireland are based on 
the Standard Occupational Classification 2010 (SOC2010) drawn from the CSO SILC 2014, while the UK results are 
based on the ISCO-08 drawn from the Eurostat EU-SILC 2014. These two occupational classifications still allow, 
however, broad occupational comparison between Ireland the UK.  
 
At 9 per cent, the incidence of being a minimum wage employee among non-Irish 
nationals was over twice that of Irish employees. With regard to age, young 
persons in the 18–29 age category had the highest incidence of NMW employment, 
at 13.9 per cent. Workers with lower levels of schooling were more likely to fall 
into the minimum wage category relative to graduates. Also, the incidence of NMW 
employment was almost three times higher among part-time workers compared 
to their full-time equivalents and was higher for workers with temporary jobs (7 
per cent) compared to those with permanent jobs (4.4 per cent). The incidence of 
NMW employment was particularly high among individuals working between 1 and 
19 hours weekly (11.7 per cent), those employed in the accommodation and food 
sector (15.3 per cent), and those in the sales (14.4 per cent) and elementary (13.4 
per cent) occupations.12  
The overall incidence of NMW employment in the UK in 2014, at 7.7 per cent, was 
higher than in Ireland.13  Some differences were identified regarding particular 
groups; relative to the Irish case, the risk of minimum wage employment in the UK 
is particularly high for part-time workers (13.6 per cent), those working 1–19 hours 
per week (19.3 per cent) and individuals working in accommodation and food (20.2 
per cent) and wholesale and retail sectors (14.4 per cent). Notwithstanding these 
differences, however, the incidence of minimum wage employment with respect 
to various characteristics was broadly similar between the two countries in terms 
of gender, nationality, age, education, occupation and type of work. 
                                                          
12 This includes occupations such as cleaners, general operatives, packers and waitresses. 
13 We adopt the same measurement approach to defining a minimum wage worker. For the UK, the 2014 cut-
off point is defined as £6.50 plus or minus 5 per cent (£6.18 to £6.83).  
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Table 1A also examines the composition of minimum wage employment across 
various worker characteristics for both the UK and Ireland. It is not surprising, given 
the higher relative incidences, that females, young people and migrants are over-
represented among the population of NMW employees in 2014. Females 
accounted for almost three-quarters of NMW workers in the period, while young 
people (18–29 years) and migrants made up 53 per cent and 26 per cent of NMW 
employees, respectively.14 These figures compare to average employment shares 
of females (51.9 per cent), young people (18.5 per cent) and migrants (13.5 per 
cent), demonstrating that these groups are disproportionately represented among 
NMW employees relative to what would be expected given their overall presence 
in the labour market. 
When comparing the two countries, it is important to note that given the higher 
overall incidence of NMW employment in the UK, there will be a tendency for all 
UK percentages to be scaled up. Moreover, when making cross-country 
comparisons, it is also important to consider the incidence of worker 
characteristics among the entire working population, which we also show in Table 
2. We see that the overall pattern, in terms of the incidence of minimum wage 
employment, is broadly similar across the two countries in respect of gender, age, 
education and job-related characteristics. However, there is a greater 
overrepresentation of young people on the minimum wage in Ireland compared to 
the UK, which can be seen by referring to the last two columns in Table 1A. The 
percentage of NMW workers who are foreign citizens is higher in Ireland than in 
the UK (25.5 per cent versus 13.6 per cent), which is not explained by the fact that 
foreign citizens in Ireland also make up a larger proportion of the entire workforce 
compared to the UK (13.5 per cent versus 9.7 per cent). 
In Table 2 we report the composition of minimum wage employment in Ireland by 
household type, level of work intensity, welfare dependence and social class. 
Relative to their general presence within the labour market, employees from 
single-adult households with children, as well as those in multi-adult households 
(with or without children), households with low levels of work intensity and 
households with high welfare dependence, are over-represented among the 
sample of minimum wage workers. We assess the relative risk of poverty and 
deprivation among NMW employees using the following three measurement 
approaches: (1) At risk of poverty (belongs to a household where total income is 
                                                          
14 In Ireland and the UK, women aged 18–29 years accounted for 39 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively, all 
of NMW workers. This is consistent with the higher incidences for female and younger workers in Ireland 
compared to the UK. 
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below 60 per cent of the median); (2) Deprived15; and (3) Consistent poverty.16 
Table 3 shows that the risk of deprivation is higher among NMW workers than 
among non-NMW workers. Our results suggest that while the majority of 
beneficiaries of minimum wage increases may come from households that are not 
economically disadvantaged, in relative terms the minimum wage does impact 
economically disadvantaged households. Specifically, the risk of poverty for 
minimum wage workers is 17 per cent, compared to 3.3 per cent for non-minimum 
wage workers. As such, the results appear consistent with previous Irish studies 
(Logue and Callan, 2016) and those from the international literature (Maître et al., 
2012; Marx and Nolan, 2012), which indicate limited overlap between low wage 
and income poverty. As Logue and Callan (2016) show in the Irish case, the main 
contributing factor to this is the presence of other earners in the household. Logue 
and Callan (2016) found that low-paid workers have a risk of poverty of 15–17 per 
cent (depending of the presence of children) when they are the sole earner in the 
household, while it ranges between 1 per cent and 2 per cent (depending on the 
presence of children) for multiple-earner households. Our analysis shows that the 
majority of NMW workers are living in multiple-earner households. As such, the 
results appear consistent with the view that the vast bulk of individuals with high 
poverty risks tend not to be in employment. 17  The poverty and deprivation 
patterns with respect to gender, as shown in Table 4, are mixed. Female NMW 
workers are more likely to be at risk of poverty (20.2 per cent compared to 7.8 per 
cent for males); however, NMW workers of both genders have deprivation rates of 
28 per cent. With respect to consistent poverty, the risk is one and a half times 
greater for male NMW employees compared to their female counterparts, at 7.6 
per cent and 5.0 per cent respectively. This suggests that while male NMW workers 
are less likely than female NMW workers to be at risk of poverty, those male 
workers that are at risk of poverty are more likely than their female counterparts 
to simultaneously experience deprivation. 
There are similar mixed results for young people and non-Irish nationals. However, 
the vast majority of NMW workers are not at risk of poverty under each of the 
metrics considered here. Nevertheless, NMW workers aged 18–29 years are more 
likely to be at risk of poverty than older age groups, but less likely to experience 
                                                          
15 Individuals are defined as deprived if they indicate that they are unable to afford  two or more of the following: 
two pairs of strong shoes, a warm waterproof overcoat, buy new (not second-hand) clothes, eat meal with meat, 
chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day, have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week, had 
to go without heating during the last year through lack of money, keep the home adequately warm, buy presents 
for family or friends at least once a year, replace any worn out furniture, have family or friends for a drink or 
meal once a month, have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment. 
16 This describes a situation whereby an individual is simultaneously at risk of poverty and deprived. 
17 In 2014 only 19 per cent of those aged 18 and over that are at risk of poverty self-defined their activity as 
working (authors’ calculations). 
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deprivation. Likewise, non-Irish nationals are more likely to be at risk of poverty 
but less likely to experience deprivation than Irish nationals.  
TABLE 2 COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYEES ON THE MINIMUM WAGE IN IRELAND (%), SILC 2014 
 % all employees 
% employees on the 
NMW 
% employees on 
NMW / % all 
employees  
Household type    
1 adult 18 years+ 6.8 2 0.29 
2 adults 18 years+ 22 16.9 0.77 
3+ adults 18 years+ 18.5 30.4 1.64 
2 adults, 1 child 13.5 4.1 0.30 
2 adults, 2 children 16.7 10.9 0.65 
2 adults, 3 children 5.9 6.9 1.17 
2 adults, 4+ children 1.6 0.5 0.31 
1 adult, children 3.2 9 2.81 
3 adults+, children 11.7 19.2 1.64 
Total 100 100  
    
Household work intensity    
Very low work intensity [0–
0.2] 
2.7 6.1 2.26 
Low work intensity [0.2–0.45] 8.5 21.8 2.56 
Medium work intensity [0.45–
0.55] 
13.7 11.1 0.81 
High work intensity [0.55–
0.85] 
27.6 34.8 1.26 
Very high work intensity 
[0.85–1] 
47.6 26.2 0.55 
Total 100 100  
    
Welfare dependence    
Social transfers <25% disp 
house income 
76.5 60.8 0.79 
25%<=Social transfers <50% 13.4 18.7 1.40 
 50%<=Social transfers <75% 7.3 12.7 1.74 
Social transfers =>75% disp 
hous income 
2.8 7.9 2.82 
Total 100 100  
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TABLE 2  (CONTD.)  
 % all employees 
% employees on the 
NMW 
% employees on 
NMW / % all 
employees  
Social class    
Higher salariat 9.7 3.5 0.36 
Lower salariat 28.1 5 0.18 
Intermediate 21.6 15.6 0.72 
Lower services, sales, 
technical 
23.2 38 1.64 
Routine  17.4 37.9 2.18 
Total 100 100  
Total number of cases 3872 198  
 
Note:  The household work intensity Eurostat measure is the ratio of the total time spent at work by all working age adults 
within a household, during the income reference period, over the total theoretical time they could have worked. 
 
Table 5 shows the primary earner status of employees in 2014. Within the labour 
market, 75 per cent of male employees and 60 per cent of female employees 
describe themselves as primary earners. However, just under 50 per cent of NMW 
workers, irrespective of gender, describe themselves as primary earners. When we 
focus on households with more than one earner, the data show that NMW 
employees are more likely to be secondary earners and this is particularly true for 
females. Just 13 per cent of NMW-earning females in multiple-earner households 
are primary earners, compared to 19.5 per cent of NMW-earning males. 
 
TABLE 3  RISK OF POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION AMONG WORKERS IN IRELAND, SILC 2014 
  Not on NMW On NMW Total 
At risk of poverty (60% median 
income) 
3.3 17.0 3.9 
Deprived 19.5 28 19.9 
Consistent poverty 1.6 5.7 1.8 
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TABLE 4  RISK OF POVERTY AND DEPRIVATION BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP IN IRELAND, SILC 
2014 
  Employees on the minimum wage 
  
At risk of poverty (60% 
median income) 
Deprived Consistent poverty 
    
Male 7.8 27.9 7.6 
Female 20.2 28.0 5.0 
    
Young people (18–29) 23.3 22.9 7.0 
All other age groups (30+) 10.1 33.6 4.1 
    
Irish 13.3 32.9 6.4 
Non-Irish 27.5 14.1 3.5 
    
Total 17.0 28 5.7 
 
 
In Table 6 we show the distribution of part-time and full-time employees by 
minimum wage status. Part-time workers account for 51 per cent of all NMW 
employees and 56 per cent of female NMW employees.18 Therefore, uncovering 
the motives for the uptake of low-paid, part-time work among females is important 
to understand the factors underlying the gender imbalance in NMW employment. 
Part-time employees in the SILC data were asked a series of questions regarding 
their motives for accepting their current job, which provides us with some insight 
into the motives for accepting NMW employment, albeit one that is restricted to 
the part-time component of the labour market. As shown in Table 7, just under 
three-quarters of male part-time NMW workers describe themselves as under-
employed, meaning they want to work more hours or work in a full-time job, 
compared to just under one-third of female part-time NMW workers. The 
comparable figure for all male employees, as opposed to just those on the NMW, 
is 58 per cent, whereas the figure for female employees remains unchanged. Just 
under one-quarter of part-time females accepted their part-time NMW job 
because it enabled them to look after children or other people; however, this was 
not a factor influencing the decision of part-time NMW male employees. Females 
may face constraints that impact their ability to transition from part-time to full-
time employment. This could be due to the gendered division of work in the home, 
if there is an expectation that women’s paid work will fit their family life (McRae, 
2003). Welfare policies may also create disincentives for women with children to 
                                                          
18 The figure of 51 per cent is the sum of males and working part-time (9.7 per cent + 41.3 per cent) and 56 per 
cent is derived from the percentage of part-time female workers on the NMW among all women on the NMW 
(41.3 per cent / 41.3 per cent + 33 per cent).  
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return to full-time work (Tomlinson, 2006). In Ireland, the high cost of childcare is 
a particularly important factor influencing women’s employment decisions. Finally, 
just over 20 per cent of male and female part-time NMW workers accepted their 
current job as it enabled them to combine work with education and training.19  
TABLE 5 PRIMARY EARNER STATUS OF EMPLOYEES IN IRELAND, SILC 2014 
  % all employees % employees on the MW 
   
Male 75.5 47.5 
Female 59.7 49.0 
Young (18–29) 48.8 40.2 
Non-Irish nationals 66 43 
All employees 67.2 48.6 
   
When there is more than one earner in the household: 
   
Male 62.6 19.5 
Female 32.6 13.2 
Young (18 –29) 30.1 12.8 
Non-Irish nationals 48.8 26.1 
All employees 47.5 14.9 
 
 
TABLE 6  DISTRIBUTION OF PART-TIME AND FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES BY NMW STATUS IN 
IRELAND, SILC 2014 
 All employees Employees on the MW 
Male working full-time 41.2 16 
Male working part-time 6.2 9.7 
Female working full-time 33 33 
Female working part-time 19.6 41.3 
Total 100 100 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
19 From the SILC survey we cannot establish whether or not part-time NMW workers that are also in education 
or in training are full-time students. However, they all define their principal economic status as being at work as 
opposed to being in education or training. 
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TABLE 7  REASON FOR WORKING PART-TIME AMONG WORKERS BY GENDER IN IRELAND, SILC 
2014 
 Employees on the MW All employees 
  Male Female Male Female 
Undergoing education or training 23.5 22.5 18.6 8.8 
Want to work more hours, but cannot find a full-time job or 
work more hours in this job 
72.5 32.5 57.5 32.5 
Do not want to work more hours 3.9 9.2 8.3 17.2 
Number of hours in all jobs are considered as full-time job  3.4 3.6 2.1 
Looking after children or other people  23.8 3.8 27.0 
Other reasons  8.6 8.2 12.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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CHAPTER 4  
Multivariate analysis 
We use the pooled (2013 and 2014) SILC data to identify the extent to which 
various worker, household and job characteristics influence the probability that an 
employee will earn the NMW. We adopt a forward stepwise approach to the 
analysis by beginning with a very basic specification that controls for gender, age, 
education and nationality, before adding other variables related to household 
composition, location, contractual status, occupation and sector. The advantage of 
this approach is that it enables us to get a sense of the extent to which the higher 
NMW incidence of particular groups is driven by other characteristics that are 
heavily concentrated within that group. For instance, if we observe that the 
increased probability of females being minimum wage workers falls when we add 
household composition to the model, this would suggest that the higher 
proportions of females earning the NMW are, at least partially, driven by a higher 
concentration within certain household types. As with the descriptive analysis 
above, the models exclude workers under the age of 18 and, consequently, the 
estimates refer to the probability of being in receipt of the adult NMW rate. In our 
empirical analysis, the probability of being on the minimum wage is a function of 
personal, human capital and job-related variables. Specifically, 
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where MinWagei is a binary variable that equals one if individual i earns in or 
around the minimum wage.20 We control for the individual’s gender, nationality 
(Irish or non-Irish), age, education and geographic location (Dublin, 
border/midland/west, or south and east). In addition, we include explanatory 
variables to indicate the individual’s family status (number of adults and children, 
single/married, primary earner), work status (type of contract, hours worked, job 
tenure) as well as variables capturing firm characteristics (public/private sector and 
firm size). Regarding occupation, we report results from two separate 
specifications; one based on the individual’s occupation and one based on the 
sector in which they work.  
Estimating equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) corresponds to a linear 
probability model. However, this is problematic as the estimated probabilities are 
not constrained to the 0-1 interval. Therefore, we estimate the probit model,  
                                                          
20 Defined as +/- 5 per cent of the adult minimum wage. 
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𝑃𝑟(𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)    (2) 
where F(·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the normal distribution 
and xi denotes the vector of independent variables referred to in equation (1). We 
estimate the model on the entire pooled sample of individuals from the 2013 and 
2014 SILC data. In addition, we separately estimate the model for various 
subgroups, including males, females, non-Irish nationals and young people (18–29 
years).  
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CHAPTER 5 
Results 
Table 8 shows the results from our probit model (equation 1). As we are pooling 
two years of data, 2013 and 2014, and given the longitudinal component of the 
SILC data, some individuals appear in both 2013 and 2014. Specifically, there are 
6,480 observations; 4,090 individuals appear just once and 1,195 appear in both 
years. Accordingly, we cluster standard errors at the individual level. We adopt a 
forward stepwise approach and report results from six different specifications. The 
most basic is specification (1), which includes gender as the only explanatory 
variable. We gradually add additional covariates to each specification as follows: 
age, nationality, education and marital status in specification (2); region, family 
type and primary earner status in specification (3); and private/public sector, hours 
worked, contract type, job tenure and firm size in specification (4). Specifications 
(5) and (6) are the fully specified models; the only difference between them being 
that specification (5) includes occupation controls and (6) includes sectoral 
controls.  
The results from specification (1) of the pooled model indicate that, before 
controlling for other factors, being female raises a worker’s likelihood of being in 
receipt of the NMW by 3 percentage points.21 This is in line with the descriptive 
statistics that also show a gap of approximately 3 percentage points between men 
and women. The relatively low impact of gender on the risk of NMW employment 
reflects the fact that while females have a relatively higher exposure to the 
minimum wage than males, the overwhelming majority of employees of both 
genders earn above the NMW. As such, being female in itself only slightly increases 
the probability that a worker will earn the NMW.  
The results from specifications (2) and (3) show that characteristics related to a 
worker’s age, nationality and education have a larger impact on the probability of 
earning the NMW than gender. Specifically, people aged 18–29 years are between 
6 and 9 percentage points more likely to earn the NMW than those aged 50–59 
years, while non-Irish nationals are 5 percentage points more likely to earn the 
NMW than Irish employees. With respect to education, employees qualified to 
lower second level (or below) are 6 to 7 percentage points more likely to earn the 
NMW than graduates.  
                                                          
21 The marginal effects are shown in the tables of results, as are the standard errors of the marginal effects. For 
continuous independent variables, this indicates the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the 
variable. For dummy variables, the marginal effects indicate the discrete change in the probability.  
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Other noteworthy aspects of the model include the finding that employees in 
single-adult households with children and households consisting of three or more 
adults and children are more likely to earn the NMW. 22  While this does not 
contribute to the gender differential, it highlights potential barriers faced by lone 
parents in accessing the labour market, with the models suggesting that much of 
the 4 percentage point disadvantage faced by this group can be explained by job 
type and sector.  
TABLE 8  MINIMUM WAGE PROBIT MODEL: POOLED SILC DATA (2013 AND 2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
Male (ref)       
Female 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Irish (ref)       
Non-Irish national  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.03*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Age 50–59 (ref)       
18–29   0.09*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
30–39  0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
40–49  0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Over 60  0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Further/Higher educ (ref)       
Lower 2nd or less  0.07*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.00 0.03*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
Upper 2nd, Tech or Voc  0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01** -0.00 0.01 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Couple (ref)       
Single  0.01* 0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Dublin (ref)       
Border/Midland/West   0.02*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 
   (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
South and East   0.02*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 
   (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
2 adults with children (ref)       
1 adult no child   -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
2 adults no children   -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
   (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
                                                          
22 The results are robust to the inclusion of a dummy variable which indicates whether the employee has a 
dependent child. For example, in three-adult households with children, one of the adults may be an adult child 
of the other two adult parents. In this case, the adult child has no dependents, whereas the adult parents do. 
Including this dummy variable does not result in a statistically significant coefficient; neither does it substantially 
alter the other results.  
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TABLE 8 (CONTD.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
3+ adults no child   0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
1 adult with children   0.04** 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 
   (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
3+ adults with children   0.03** 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 
   (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Not primary earner (ref)       
Primary earner   -0.02*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
   (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Public sector (ref)       
Private sector    0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Permanent contract (ref)       
Temporary contract    -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Occasional contract    0.01 0.00 0.00 
    (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Over 35 hours worked (ref)       
1–19 hours    0.02*** 0.01 0.02** 
    (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
20–34 hours    0.01 -0.00 0.00 
    (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
10+ years tenure (ref)       
0 years    0.06*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 
    (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) 
1–4 years    0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
    (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
5–9 years    0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Firm size 50+ (ref)       
1–10 employees    0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
11–19 employees    0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
20–49 employees    0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Occupation manager + 
profess+ associate profess + 
clerical and secretarial (ref) 
      
Skilled trades     0.03**  
     (0.013)  
Caring, leisure and other 
services 
    0.05***  
     (0.014)  
Sales and customer services     0.08***  
     (0.017)  
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
    0.03**  
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TABLE 8 (CONTD.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
     (0.015)  
Elementary     0.09***  
     (0.016)  
Tertiary23 (ref)        
Industry      0.00 
      (0.006) 
Agric + forestry + fishing      0.01 
      (0.016) 
Wholesale and retail trade      0.01* 
      (0.006) 
Transport and storage      -0.01 
      (0.009) 
Accommodation and food      0.03*** 
      (0.011) 
Observations 6,480 6,480 6,480 6,480 6,480 6,480 
 
Notes:  Spec (1) controls for gender. Spec (2) adds controls for age, nationality, education and marital status. Spec (3) adds 
 controls for region, family type and primary earner status. Spec (4) adds controls for private/public sector, hours 
worked, contract type, job tenure and firm size. Spec (5) includes occupational controls and spec (6) sectoral controls. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01. 
 
Looking at the job characteristics of workers, being employed in a small firm raises 
the probability of earning the NMW by 3 percentage points, while a job in sales or 
elementary occupations raises the likelihood of NMW employment by 8 and 9 
percentage points respectively. With regard to sector, specification (6) shows that 
being employed in the accommodation and food sector increases the probability 
of earning the minimum wage by 3 percentage points. There is also a regional 
effect, with workers in the border/midland/west and south/east regions being 1 to 
2 percentage points more likely to be in minimum wage employment than workers 
in Dublin. Unsurprisingly, workers in the private sector are more likely to earn the 
minimum wage, as are workers with low tenure and those working a small number 
of hours. It should be noted that tenure and age are positively correlated. 24 
Therefore, disentangling the separate effects of these two variables on the 
probability of minimum wage employment is difficult; some of the apparent tenure 
effect may instead be related to age. The coefficient for the age variable (18–29 
years) is relatively large and statistically significant in specifications (1) to (3). 
However, when we add in the tenure controls in specification (4), the age 
coefficient becomes smaller and not statistically significant, whereas the tenure 
variable is positive and statistically significant. The fact that minimum wage work 
                                                          
23 finance + insurance + prof + scientific + admin support+ pub admin and defence + educ + health and social 
work + other services 
24 For example, the correlation coefficient between having 1 to 4 years’ tenure and being aged 18–29 years is 
0.3. 
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is associated with low tenure may also be attributable to high turnover in jobs that 
are relatively unstable and offer little job security.  
With respect to gender, we see the estimated coefficient declines from 3 to 2 
percentage points when we control for family type and primary earnings status 
(specification (2)). The risk falls to 1 percentage point when we include controls for 
job type and when we include controls for occupation and sector. The empirical 
analysis suggests that the female disadvantage arises primarily from the types of 
jobs females undertake and the sector and occupation within which these jobs are 
located. Table 8 also shows that young people aged 18–29 years are 9 percentage 
points more likely to be in receipt of the NMW relative to those aged 50–59. The 
youth penalty disappeared when job tenure, job characteristics, occupation and 
sector were included in the model. The results suggest that the higher NMW risk 
faced by young people is explained by factors such as lower levels of experience 
and sector of employment. Finally, while it is also the case that much of the higher 
relative risk of both migrants and individuals with low levels of schooling is 
accounted for when we control for both job type and sector, a risk of up to 3 
percentage points cannot be explained by the data in our models. 
When we estimate a broadly similar model for the UK (Table A1 in the appendix), 
we get a very similar pattern to Ireland. The effects of gender, nationality, 
education, single-parent households and firm size on the likelihood of minimum 
wage employment in the UK strongly resemble the Irish results. A number of 
differences do exist. Specifically, working 1 to 19 hours in the UK has a stronger 
effect on the probability of being a minimum wage worker, compared to the Irish 
data. There are also differences relating to occupation, with craft and protective 
services occupations having a greater increase on minimum wage employment and 
sales having a smaller effect, compared to Ireland.  
We also estimate equation (1) separately for females, males, non-Irish nationals 
and young people (18–29 years); the results are shown in Tables A2–5 respectively, 
in the appendix. It should be noted that the results of the separate models are not 
directly comparable as they are estimated on distinct samples; however, they do 
give us a sense of the extent to which different factors are at play within the 
subgroups. The nationality effect is particularly strong when we focus on females 
only (Table A2); depending on the specification, non-Irish females are 2–7 
percentage points more likely to be minimum wage workers than Irish females. 
Likewise, education is an important contributing factor as females with lower 
second-level education or less are 3–9 percentage points more likely to be 
minimum wage workers, compared to females with tertiary education. The non-
Irish national impact was lowest in the specification controlling for occupation, 
suggesting that non-Irish national females are heavily concentrated in professions 
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where low wages are more common, such as sales or elementary occupations.25 
Focusing on young people (those aged 18–29 years; see Table A5) indicates that 
being female and being a non-Irish national increases the probability of being a 
minimum wage worker, by 4–5 percentage points and 6–8 percentage points 
respectively.  
For males, the nationality and education effects are significant but smaller than 
they are for females; non-Irish males are 1–4 percentage points more likely to be 
on the minimum wage than Irish males, and males with low education levels are 
0–5 percentage points more likely to be minimum wage workers than well-
educated males (Table A3). Males employed in sales occupations are most likely to 
be on the NMW.  
Focusing on non-Irish nationals, occupation is particularly important; non-Irish 
workers in sales occupations are 19 percentage points more likely to be on the 
minimum wage than non-Irish professionals (Table A4). Other important factors 
are gender, age and tenure. Non-Irish females are 4–7 percentage points more 
likely to be on the minimum wage than non-Irish males; younger non-Irish 
nationals (18–29 years) are 7–12 percentage points more likely to be on the 
minimum wage than older non-Irish nationals (50–59 years); and non-Irish workers 
with 1–4 years’ tenure are 7–11 percentage points more likely to be on the 
minimum wage than experienced workers (those with 10 years’ experience or 
more).  
In terms of occupation, similarly strong effects are found when we focus on young 
people aged 18–29 years (Table A5), where individuals in sales occupations are 18 
percentage points more likely to be minimum wage workers. The gender effect is 
also important; young women are 3–5 percentage points more likely to be on the 
minimum wage than young men. Finally, being employed within a small firm (1 to 
10 employees) raises the probability that a young person will be paid the NMW by 
10 percentage points.  
 
                                                          
25 ‘Elementary’ is a diverse occupational category consisting of professions that do not easily fall into any of the 
other definitional groupings. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Summary and conclusions 
From 2007 to 2016, the National Minimum Wage (NMW) in Ireland was €8.65 per 
hour for an adult worker. However, following the establishment of a Low Pay 
Commission in 2015 and their subsequent recommendations, recent amendments 
have been made to the NMW. The rate for an adult worker increased from €8.65 
to €9.15 per hour in January 2016, with a further increase to €9.25 from January 
2017.  
When designing and implementing minimum wage policies, it is important to know 
which segments of the population are most affected by these changes. In this 
study, we address gaps in the literature by investigating the relative incidence of 
minimum wage employment across distinct groups of workers in the labour market 
and identify the risk factors that increase an individual’s probability of being a 
minimum wage worker. We use Irish data from 2013 and 2014 that includes a rich 
set of personal, family and job-related characteristics. We find that just under 5 
per cent of workers were in receipt of the NMW in 2014, a figure below the 
comparable UK rate of 7.7 per cent. The proportion of female employees earning 
the NMW was 6.9 per cent, which compares to an incidence of 2.7 per cent among 
male employees. The compositional analysis indicates that females account for 
almost three-quarters of NMW employees. However, multivariate analysis 
suggests that a good deal of the observed gender differential was related to the 
type of jobs more typically undertaken by female NMW employees. Specifically, 
females earning the NMW were more concentrated in certain sectors and 
occupations, and had a higher propensity to have lower occupational tenure, to be 
employed in small firms and to work part-time. We found that the gender 
differential decreased only slightly when various household and family 
characteristics are controlled for, such as secondary earning status and the 
presence of children, suggesting that the type of jobs undertaken by low-paid 
female workers may be as important in explaining the NMW status as factors 
related to household or caring responsibilities. Given that the majority of female 
NMW workers are employed part-time, we were able to exploit a battery of 
questions on the motives for taking up part-time work to explore the issue further. 
While 72 per cent of male workers indicated that they were in part-time 
employment because they could not secure a full-time position, the comparable 
figure for females was 33 per cent. Just under one-quarter of females working part-
time accepted their part-time NMW job because it enabled them to look after 
children or other people. This may be due to constraints facing females, such as 
the high cost of childcare, which limits their ability to transition from part-time to 
full-time employment. A further 20 per cent of female part-time NMW workers 
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accepted their current job because it enabled them to combine work with 
education and training.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that factors related to occupational segregation 
may be as important as family responsibilities in understanding the higher 
incidence of NMW employment among females. However, the two factors are 
unlikely to be independent as family circumstances are likely to play a substantial 
role in the job search behaviour of a large proportion of female workers, 
particularly those seeking part-time employment. 
At 9 per cent, the incidence of minimum wage pay among non-Irish nationals was 
over twice that of Irish employees. With regard to age, young people aged 18–29 
years had the highest exposure to NMW employment, at 13.9 per cent. Workers 
with lower levels of schooling were more likely to fall into the minimum wage 
category relative to graduates. The youth disadvantage became statistically 
insignificant within the multivariate framework when factors related to job type 
were included (such as part-time work, temporary contract, working in a small 
firm). As was the case for gender, these results suggest that much of the non-Irish 
national and low educational disadvantages are explained by a combination of job 
type variables and a higher relative concentration in low-paid occupations. 
Nevertheless, a substantial non-Irish national penalty remains in specifications 
containing all relevant controls and this is a potential cause for concern. 
Our analysis also contributes to the debate in the literature as to whether an NMW 
is an effective tool for combating poverty. While this is rarely stated as an explicit 
objective of the NMW, minimum and living wage levels are often key elements in 
the debate surrounding in-work poverty. We find that while minimum wage 
workers have an above-average tendency to belong to economically 
disadvantaged households, they make up only a relatively small proportion of the 
total population of minimum wage employees. Over one-quarter (28 per cent) of 
employees on the minimum wage in 2014 were from deprived households, 
compared to 19.5 per cent of workers earning above the NMW. Therefore, 
minimum wage increases will also benefit a large number of individuals who are 
not from economically disadvantaged or deprived households. As found previously 
by Logue and Callan (2016), our analysis shows that the majority of NMW workers 
are in multiple-earner households and as a consequence have a lower risk of 
poverty. The estimates confirm previous analysis, by both the Irish Low Pay 
Commission and Logue and Callan (2016), that the NMW represents a relatively 
ineffective policy tool for reducing poverty in Ireland as, similar to the UK, 
household poverty risk may be more a problem of joblessness (Nickel, 2004; 
Watson et al., 2012).  
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From a policy perspective, the research raises a number of important questions. 
While females’ risk of earning the NMW is low, it is clear that, for many females on 
the NMW, their low income relates to their part-time status and higher 
concentration in sectors such as ‘wholesale and retail’, ‘accommodation and food’ 
and ‘other’. Further research is required to understand the extent to which females 
who choose to work part-time can do so within their chosen occupations or are 
forced to switch to lower-paying sectors and occupations that are typically 
associated with part-time employment. Given that sectoral effects also appear to 
play a role in explaining the higher relative risk experienced by females, non-Irish 
nationals and young people, further investigation is required into the reasons 
underlying low pay in sectors where NMW employees are heavily concentrated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References30 
REFERENCES 
Autor, D. H., A. Manning and C. L. Smith (2016). ‘The contribution of the minimum wage to 
US wage inequality over three decades: A reassessment’, American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 58-99. 
Baek, J. and W. Park (2016). ‘Minimum wage introduction and employment: Evidence from 
South Korea’, Economics Letters, Vol. 139, pp. 18-21. 
Belman, D., P. Wolfson and K. Nawakitphaitoon (2015). ‘Who is affected by the minimum 
wage?’, Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 
582-621. 
Blau, F.D. and L.M. Kahn (2003). ‘Understanding international differences in the gender pay 
gap’, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 106-144. 
Collins, M. (2015). ‘A profile of those on the minimum wage’, NERI Working Paper Series 
Number 27. Dublin: Nevin Economic Research Institute.  
CSO (2017). ‘QNHS – National minimum wage wstimates’, CSO Statistical Release. Cork: 
CSO. 
Dickens, R., R. Riley and D. Wilkinson (2015). ‘A re‐examination of the impact of the UK 
national minimum wage on employment’, Economica, Vol. 82, No. 328, pp. 841-
864. 
Dolton, P., C. R. Bondibene and M. Stops (2015). ‘Identifying the employment effect of 
invoking and changing the minimum wage: A spatial analysis of the UK’, Labour 
Economics, Vol. 37, pp. 54-76. 
England, P. and N. Folbre (1999). ‘The  cost of caring’, The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 561, No. 1, pp. 39-51. 
Eurostat (2016). ‘1 out of 6 employees in the European Union is a low-wage earner’, 
Eurostat News Release 246/2016. Luxembourg: Eurostat Press Office. 
Garnero, A., S. Kampelmann and F. Rycx (2014). ‘Minimum wage systems and earnings 
inequalities: Does institutional diversity matter?’, European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 115-130. 
Gregory, M and S. Connolly (2008). ‘The price of reconciliation: Part-time work, families 
and women’s satisfaction’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 526, pp. 1-7. 
Hirsch, B.T., B.E. Kaufman and T. Zelenska (2015). ‘Minimum wage channels of 
adjustment’, Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Vol. 54, No. 2, 
pp. 199-239. 
Holton, N. and D. O’Neill (2017). ‘The changing nature of Irish wage inequality from boom 
to bust’, Economic and Social Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 1-26. 
Irish Low Pay Commission (2016). Recommendations for the National Minimum Wage. 
Dublin: Low Pay Commission. 
Joshi, H., P. Pierella and J. Waldfogel (1999). ‘The wages of motherhood: Better or worse?’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 543-564. 
31A study of  minimum wage employment  in  I re land  
 
 
Liu, S., T.J. Hyclak and K. Regmi (2016). ‘Impact of the minimum wage on youth labor 
markets’, Labour, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 18-37. 
Logue, C. and T. Callan (2016). Low pay, minimum wages and household incomes: Evidence 
for Ireland. Budget Perspectives 2017, Paper 3, Dublin: Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
Lucifora, C., A. McKnight and W. Salverda (2005). ‘Low-wage employment in Europe: A 
review of the evidence’, Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 259-292. 
Maître, B., B. Nolan and C.T. Whelan (2012). ‘Low Pay, In-work poverty and economic 
vulnerability: A comparative analysis using EU-SILC’, The Manchester School, Vol. 
80, No. 1, pp. 99-116. 
Manning, A. and B. Petrongola (2008). ‘The part-time pay gap for women in Britain’, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 118, No. 526, pp. F28-F51. 
MaCurdy, T. (2015). ‘How effective is the minimum wage at supporting the poor?’, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 123, No. 2, pp. 497-545. 
Marx, I. and B. Nolan (2012). ‘In-work poverty’, GINI Discussion Paper 51. 
McGinnity, F. and P. McManus (2007). ‘Paying the price for reconciling work and family life: 
Comparing the wage penalty for women’s part-time work in Britain, Germany and 
the United States’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 115-134.  
McGuinness, S. and J. Freebairn (2007). ‘Who are the low paid?’, Australian Journal of 
Labour Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 17-37. 
McGuinness, S., E. Kelly, P. O’Connell and T. Callan (2011). ‘The impact of wage bargaining 
and worker preferences on the gender pay gap’, European Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 277-293. 
McRae, S. (2003). ‘Constraints and choices in mothers’ employment careers: A 
consideration of Hakim’s preference theory’, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, 
No. 3, pp. 317-338. 
Nickel, S. (2004). ‘Poverty and worklessness in Britain’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 114, No. 
494, pp. 1-25. 
OECD (2015). Minimum wages after the crisis: Making them pay, Paris: OECD. 
Sabia, J.J. and R.B. Nielsen (2015). ‘Minimum wages, poverty, and material hardship: New 
evidence from the SIPP’, Review of Economics of the Household, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 
95-134. 
Schafer, A. and K. Gottschall (2015). ‘From wage regulation to wage gap: How wage-setting 
institutions and structures shape the gender wage gap across three industries in 
24 European countries and Germany’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, 
No. 2, pp. 467-496. 
Tomlinson, J. (2006). ‘Women’s work-life balance trajectories in the UK: Reformulating 
choice and constraint in transitions through part-time work across the life-course’, 
British Journal of Guidance and Counselling, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 365-382.  
References32 
Watson, D., Maître, B. and Whelan, C.T. (2012) Work and poverty in Ireland: An analysis of 
the CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2004–2010, Dublin: The 
Department of Social Protection and the ESRI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33Appendix  
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1  MINIMUM WAGE PROBIT MODEL FOR THE UK: POOLED DATA (EU-SILC 2013 AND 
2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Female 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Foreign citizen  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01** 0.02*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Age 50–59 (ref)       
18–29  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
30–39  -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
40–49  -0.01 -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Over 60  0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ref group: less than 3rd level       
Education_Thirdlevel  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ref: not single       
Single  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Ref group: 2 adults with children       
1 adult no child   0.01 0.02** 0.01* 0.01* 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2 adults no children   -0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
3+ adults no child   0.01 0.02** 0.01* 0.01** 
   (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
1 adult with children   0.04*** 0.03** 0.02* 0.03** 
   (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
3+ adults with children   0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Ref group: Permanent contract       
contract_temporary    0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Over 35 hours worked (ref)       
1–19 hours    0.11*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 
    (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) 
20–34 hours    0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
    (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Firm size 50+ (ref)       
1–10 employees    0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
11–19 employees    0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
20–49 employees    0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
    (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ref group: managers       
Craft     0.07***  
     (0.007)  
Personal protective services     0.09*  
     (0.047)  
Sales     0.03***  
     (0.011)  
Plant and machinery operatives     0.07***  
     (0.014)  
Elementary     0.12***  
     (0.012)  
       
Ref group: admin/health/public 
admin and defence 
      
Industry      0.01 
      (0.006) 
Agriculture and forestry      0.03 
      (0.027) 
Wholesale and retail      0.05*** 
      (0.007) 
Accommodation and food      0.06*** 
      (0.012) 
       
Observations 14,711 14,711 14,711 14,711 14,711 14,711 
 
Notes:  Spec (1) controls for gender. Spec (2) adds controls for age, nationality, education and marital status. Spec (3) adds 
controls for family type. Spec (4) adds controls for hours worked, contract type and firm size. Spec (5) includes 
occupational controls and spec (6) sectoral controls. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01. 
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TABLE A2  MINIMUM WAGE PROBIT MODEL (FEMALES ONLY), SILC 2013 AND 2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Irish (ref)      
Non-Irish national 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.04*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) 
Age 50–59 (ref)      
18–29 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) 
30–39 0.03** 0.03* 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
40–49 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Over 60 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) 
Further/Higher Eeuc (ref)      
Lower 2nd or less 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.04** -0.00 0.03** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.015) (0.008) (0.014) 
Upper 2nd, Tech or Voc 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.00 0.01* 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Couple (ref)      
Single 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Dublin (ref)      
Border/Midland/West  0.04*** 0.02** 0.01 0.02* 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
South and East  0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01** 
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
2 adults with children (ref)      
1 adult no child  -0.03** -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
2 adults no children  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
3+ adults no child  0.02* 0.02* 0.02 0.02* 
  (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) 
1 adult with children  0.05** 0.02 0.02 0.03* 
  (0.024) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) 
3+ adults with children  0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.016) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
Not primary earner (ref)      
Primary earner  -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Public sector (ref)      
Private sector   0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Permanent contract (ref)      
Temporary contract   0.01 0.01 0.01 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Occasional contract   0.02 0.01 0.02 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
Over 35 hours worked (ref)      
1–19 hours   0.04*** 0.01 0.03*** 
   (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) 
20–34 hours   0.00 -0.00 0.00 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
10+ years tenure (ref)      
0 years   0.07*** 0.05** 0.08*** 
   (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) 
1–4 years   0.05*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 
   (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
5–9 years   0.01 0.00 0.01 
   (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Firm size 50+ (ref)      
1–10 employees   0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
   (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
11–19 employees   0.02* 0.02 0.02* 
   (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
20–49 employees   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Occupation manager + profess+ 
associate profess + clerical and 
secretarial (ref) 
     
Skilled trades    0.07*  
    (0.040)  
Caring, leisure and other services    0.06***  
    (0.017)  
Sales and customer services    0.08***  
    (0.020)  
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
   0.02  
    (0.036)  
Elementary    0.13***  
    (0.026)  
Tertiary (ref)       
Industry     0.01 
     (0.012) 
Agric + forestry + fishing     -0.01 
     (0.021) 
Wholesale and retail trade     0.01 
     (0.009) 
Transport and storage     -0.00 
     (0.031) 
Accommodation and food     0.07*** 
     (0.020) 
      
Observations 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 
 
Notes:  Spec (1) adds controls for age, nationality, education and marital status. Spec (2) adds controls for region, family 
type and primary earner status. Spec (3) adds controls for private/public sector, hours worked, contract type, job 
tenure and firm size. Spec (4) includes occupational controls and spec (5) sectoral controls. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01. 
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TABLE A3  MINIMUM WAGE PROBIT MODEL (MALES ONLY), SILC 2013 AND 2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
Irish (ref)      
Non-Irish national 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.01** 0.01 0.01* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Age 50–59 (ref)      
18–29 0.08*** 0.04* 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
30–39 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
40–49 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Over 60 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Further/Higher educ (ref)      
Lower 2nd or less 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.00 0.02** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Upper 2nd, Tech or Voc 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Couple (ref)      
Single 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Dublin (ref)      
Border/Midland/West  0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
South and East  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
2 adults with children (ref)      
1 adult no child  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
2 adults no children  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
3+ adults no child  -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
3+ adults with children  0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) 
Not primary earner (ref)      
Primary earner  -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* 
  (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Public sector (ref)      
Private sector   0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Permanent contract (ref)      
Temporary contract   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Occasional contract   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Over 35 hours worked (ref)      
1–19 hours   0.00 -0.00 0.00 
   (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
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TABLE A3  (CONTD.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
20–34 hours   0.01 0.00 0.01 
   (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
10+ years tenure (ref)      
0 years   0.03 0.02 0.03 
   (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) 
1–4 years   0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 
   (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
5–9 years   0.02** 0.01* 0.02** 
   (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Firm size 50+ (ref)      
1–10 employees   0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
   (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
11–19 employees   0.01 0.00 0.01 
   (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) 
20–49 employees   0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
   (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
Occupation manager + profess+ 
associate profess + clerical and 
secretarial (ref) 
     
Skilled trades    0.02*  
    (0.009)  
Caring, leisure and other services    0.04  
    (0.031)  
Sales and customer services    0.10***  
    (0.035)  
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
   0.02*  
    (0.012)  
Elementary    0.05***  
    (0.017)  
Tertiary (ref)       
Industry     -0.00 
     (0.004) 
Agric + forestry + fishing     0.01 
     (0.012) 
Wholesale and retail trade     0.00 
     (0.005) 
Transport and storage     -0.01 
     (0.004) 
Accommodation and food     -0.00 
     (0.005) 
      
Observations 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 2,964 
 
Notes:  Spec (1) adds controls for age, nationality, education and marital status. Spec (2) adds controls for region, family 
type and primary earner status. Spec (3) adds controls for private/public sector, hours worked, contract type, job 
tenure and firm size. Spec (4) includes occupational controls and spec (5) sectoral controls. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01. 
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TABLE A4  MINIMUM WAGE PROBIT MODEL (NON-IRISH NATIONALS ONLY), SILC 2013 AND 
2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Male (ref)       
Female 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.03* 0.04** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Age 50–59 (ref)       
18–29  0.12* 0.12* 0.07 0.07 0.07 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.057) (0.053) (0.056) 
30–39  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.030) (0.035) 
40–49  -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
  (0.036) (0.037) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) 
Over 60  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 
  (0.084) (0.085) (0.076) (0.066) (0.071) 
Further/Higher educ (ref)       
Lower 2nd or less  -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.033) (0.022) (0.033) 
Upper 2nd, Tech or Voc  0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
Couple (ref)       
Single  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03** -0.03 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) 
Dublin (ref)       
Border/Midland/West   0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
   (0.029) (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
South and East   -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
   (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
2 adults with children (ref)       
1 adult no child   0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
   (0.053) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) 
2 adults no children   0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
   (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
3+ adults no child   0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 
   (0.050) (0.044) (0.041) (0.044) 
1 adult with children   -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
   (0.048) (0.034) (0.027) (0.036) 
3+ adults with children   0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.034) (0.028) (0.022) (0.028) 
Not primary earner (ref)       
Primary earner   -0.06** -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
   (0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) 
Public sector (ref)       
Private sector    0.04** 0.02 0.04** 
    (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
Permanent contract (ref)       
Temporary contract    -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
    (0.023) (0.016) (0.023) 
Occasional contract    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.033) (0.027) (0.031) 
Over 35 hours worked (ref)       
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1–19 hours    0.04 0.01 0.04 
    (0.036) (0.026) (0.036) 
20–34 hours    0.01 0.00 0.01 
    (0.023) (0.018) (0.022) 
10+ years tenure (ref)       
0 years    0.12 0.07 0.10 
    (0.089) (0.071) (0.083) 
1–4 years    0.11** 0.07* 0.10** 
    (0.043) (0.037) (0.041) 
5–9 years    0.04 0.02 0.04 
    (0.033) (0.028) (0.032) 
Firm size 50+ (ref)       
1–10 employees    0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
    (0.037) (0.034) (0.038) 
11–19 employees    0.08* 0.08* 0.07 
    (0.045) (0.041) (0.046) 
20–49 employees    0.05 0.04 0.05 
    (0.036) (0.032) (0.036) 
Occupation manager + 
profess+ associate profess + 
clerical and secretarial (ref) 
      
Skilled trades     0.02  
     (0.036)  
Caring, leisure and other 
services 
    0.13**  
     (0.065)  
Sales and customer services     0.19**  
     (0.075)  
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
    0.05  
     (0.057)  
Elementary     0.18***  
     (0.052)  
Tertiary (ref)        
Industry      -0.01 
      (0.028) 
Agric + forestry + fishing      0.03 
      (0.059) 
Wholesale and retail trade      0.00 
      (0.024) 
Transport and storage      -0.03 
      (0.033) 
Accommodation and food      0.02 
      (0.027) 
       
Observations 816 816 816 816 816 816 
 
Notes:  Spec (1) controls for gender. Spec (2) adds controls for age, nationality, education and marital status. Spec (3) adds 
controls for region, family type and primary earner status. Spec (4) adds controls for private/public sector, hours 
worked, contract type, job tenure and firm size. Spec (5) includes occupational controls and spec (6) sectoral controls. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01. 
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TABLE A5  MINIMUM WAGE PROBIT MODEL (18-29 YEARS ONLY), SILC 2013 AND 2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES       
       
Male (ref)       
Female 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.04* 0.03 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Irish (ref)       
Non-Irish national  0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.06 0.07* 
  (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
Further/Higher educ (ref)       
Lower 2nd or less  0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 
  (0.070) (0.065) (0.060) (0.049) (0.059) 
Upper 2nd, Tech or Voc  0.06** 0.05** 0.03 0.01 0.03 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
Couple (ref)       
Single  0.05* 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) 
Dublin (ref)       
Border/Midland/West   0.08** 0.05 0.03 0.06 
   (0.036) (0.033) (0.030) (0.034) 
South and East   0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
   (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
2 adults with children (ref)       
1 adult no child   -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 
   (0.061) (0.074) (0.077) (0.077) 
2 adults no children   -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 
   (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) 
3+ adults no child   0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   (0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) 
1 adult with children   0.17 0.14 0.12 0.16 
   (0.106) (0.103) (0.096) (0.108) 
3+ adults with children   0.09* 0.07 0.06 0.08* 
   (0.050) (0.046) (0.043) (0.048) 
Not primary earner (ref)       
Primary earner   -0.04* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
Public sector (ref)       
Private sector    0.04 0.02 0.04 
    (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) 
Permanent contract (ref)       
Temporary contract    0.01 0.02 0.01 
    (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
Occasional contract    0.03 0.03 0.03 
    (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) 
Over 35 hours worked (ref)       
1–19 hours    0.05* 0.01 0.04 
    (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) 
20–34 hours    -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
    (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) 
10+ years tenure (ref)       
0 years    0.20 0.20 0.21 
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TABLE A5  (CONTD.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    (0.150) (0.149) (0.155) 
1–4 years    0.11 0.10 0.12 
    (0.076) (0.073) (0.079) 
5–9 years    0.05 0.06 0.05 
    (0.099) (0.100) (0.103) 
Firm size 50+ (ref)       
1–10 employees    0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
    (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
11–19 employees    0.06 0.06 0.06 
    (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
20–49 employees    0.09** 0.08* 0.08* 
    (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) 
Occupation manager + profess+ 
associate profess + clerical and 
secretarial (ref) 
      
Skilled trades     0.05  
     (0.058)  
Caring, leisure and other services     0.12**  
     (0.059)  
Sales and customer services     0.18***  
     (0.052)  
Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
    0.10  
     (0.083)  
Elementary     0.16***  
     (0.052)  
Tertiary (finance + insurance + prof 
+ scientif + admin support+ pub 
admin and defence + educ + health 
and social work + other services) 
(ref)  
      
Industry      -0.01 
      (0.034) 
Agric + forestry + fishing      -0.05 
      (0.049) 
Wholesale and retail trade      0.04 
      (0.029) 
Transport and storage      0.02 
      (0.035) 
Accommodation and food       
Observations 965 965 965 965 965 965 
 
Notes:  Spec (1) controls for gender. Spec (2) adds controls for age, nationality, education and marital status. Spec (3) adds 
controls for region, family type and primary earner status. Spec (4) adds controls for private/public sector, hours 
worked, contract type, job tenure and firm size. Spec (5) includes occupational controls and spec (6) sectoral controls. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01 
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